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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
NELSON CLAYTON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HAL S. BENNETT, STEWART M. 
HANSEN and DONALD HACKING, 
as members of the Department of 
Business Regulation of the State of 
Utah; DEPARTMENT OF REGIS-
TRATION and FRANK E. LEES, as 
Director of the Department of Reg-
istration, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8477 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and appellant brought this action in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, seeking a declaratory judgment. The orig-
inal complaint was served upon the defendants on the lOth 
day of June, 1953, and judgment of the court below was, 
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at long last, entered in favor of these defendants and re-
spondents on the 7th day of December, 1955. The cause is 
now, all in due time, properly before this Court. 
The issues were submitted to the court below on stip-
ulation of the facts, as follows : 
"1. It is stipulated that Nelson Clayton is a 
duly licensed and registered professional engineer; 
that he is engaged in the engineering business in 
connection with the construction of buildings and 
other structures in the State of Utah; that he is a 
graduate engineer and architect with degrees in said 
professions from the University of Utah. 
"2. That Chapter 1 of Title 58, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, among other things, provides that 
within the Department of Business Regulation of 
the State of Utah there shall be a department known 
as the Department of Registration which shall be 
charged with administering the law relating to pro-
fessions, trades and occupations, including the pro-
fessions of architecture and engineering; that it is 
provided in said chapter that said Department of 
Registration shall exercise its functions-including 
the determination of the qualifications of applicants 
for a license to practice-by and through a director 
of registration under the Commission's supervision 
and in collaboration with the representative com-
mittees of the several professions, trades and occu-
pations mentioned in said chapter, including the 
professions of engineering and architecture. 
"3. That by said chapter it is provided that 
the director of registration shall designate, upon 
recommendation of members of the profession of 
architecture, a committee of three members, each 
of whom shall have been licensed to practice as an 
architect in Utah for a pe,riod of five years immed· 
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iately prior to the appointment, and that the names 
of the men1bers of said committee so designated 
shall be submitted to the Governor for his confir-
mation or rejection, and that such committee was 
so appointed and at all times herein mentioned acted 
as such. 
"4. That plaintiff applied for and on N ovem-
ber 27, 28, 29, and 30, 1951, was given an examina-
tion by the Department of Registration, in order to 
secure a license to practice as an architect in the 
State of Utah. That said comn~dttee, exercising the 
power and pursuant to the authority conferred upon 
it by said Chapter 1, Title 58, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, held and decided that under the standard of 
qualifications fixed by said committee plaintiff had 
failed to pa.ss such examination and plaintiff was 
refused a license to practice as an architect in the 
State of Utah. 
"5. The parties stipulate that Section 58-1-7, 
U. C. A., 1953, provides as is alleged in paragraph 
5 of plaintiff's complaint. 
"6. The parties stipulate that Section 58-1-13, 
U. C. A., 1953, provides as is alleged in paragraph 
6 of plaintiff's complaint. 
"7. The parties stipulate that Section 58-1-17, 
U. C. A., 1953, provides as is alleged in paragraph 
7 of plaintiff's complaint. 
"8. Said act further provides that it shall be 
unlawful for any person to practice or engage in or 
attempt to practice or engage in any profession, 
trade or occupation that may be subject to the De-
partment of Registration without authority so to do 
as in said title provided ; and said act lists among 
the professions, trades and occupations as subject 
to the control of the Department of Registration, 
architects and engineers. 
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"9. The parties stipulate and agree that the 
allegations of paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the com-
plaint are conclusions of law and by entering into 
this stipulation plaintiff does not waive the conten-
tion that said paragraphs correctly allege the law 
and the defendants do not waive their contention 
and denial that said allegations correctly allege the 
law, and said issues of law are herewith submitted 
to the court for decision. 
"10. That plaintiff desires and intends to en-
gage in architectural work in the State of Utah with-
out the procurement of a license; that the defendants 
have threatened to take criminal action against the 
plaintiff if he does so engage in architectural work 
without a license and without complying with the 
provisions of the above mentioned statutes; that 
plaintiff must either comply with the terms of the 
statute or engage in architectural work without re-
gard to said statute and run the risk that the statute 
may be held consitutional; that if plaintiff engages 
in architectural work without a license, plaintiff 
will be subjected to a multiplicity of suits and crim-
inal prosecution. 
"11. That the plaintiff was examined by the 
Department of Registration of the State of Utah, on 
the 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th days of November, 
1951, in a manner and procedure provided by law; 
that the said plaintiff failed to pass the said exam-
ination but that thereafter, upon the petition of the 
said plaintiff and upon hearing said petition, the 
Business Regulation Commission, sitting and acting 
as Director of the Department of Registration, State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, did find that the here-
inabove referred to Architects Representative Com-
mittee did violate a portion of the rules of the Archi-
tects Examining Committee in that: 
" (a) it failed to complete the inspe·ction of 
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the answers submitted by applicants within ten days 
after the close of the examination; 
"(b) the examination given was conducted 
under adverse conditions in that materials and sup-
plies were not ready at the beginning of the archi-
tectural composition problem; 
" (c) proper preparations were not made prior 
to the conducting of said examination; 
" (d) and that the applicants were not af-
forded the allotted time to solve the architectural 
composition problem; and that, therefore, said Busi-
ness Regulation Committee did order plaintiff's. re-
examination. 
"12. That the educational qualifications of the 
plaintiff were, prior to the time of the filing of this 
complaint, admitted and accepted by the Department 
of Business Regulation of the State of Utah. 
"13. That the question of whether the plain-
tiff was arbitrarily or capriciously denied a passing 
grade is not raised as an issue herein. 
"14. That plaintiff was, under the provisions 
of 58-1-16, granted an opportunity for re ... examina-
tion, but that the said plaintiff refused and does now 
continue to refuse to a vail himself of said oppor-
tunity. 
"15. That the legal effect of the failure of 
the plaintiff to submit to further examination is left 
for the court for decision." 
It was ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court 
below: 
"That the plaintiff take nothing by this action; 
that the defendants have judgment." 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN THE PROFES-
SION OF ARCHITECTURE IS A PROPERTY 
RIGHT WHICH APPELLANT IS ENTITLED 
TO PROTECT BY RECOURSE TO THE 
COURTS. 
POINT II 
AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY HAS NO 
POWER TO PASS ON THE CONSTITUTION-
ALITY OF A LEGISLATIVE ACT. 
POINT III 
THE DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE PRO-
CEDURE IS A CORRECT PROCEDURE FOR 
C'HALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF THE STATUTES IN QUESTION. 
POINT IV 
SECTIONS 7 AND 13 OF CHAPTER 1, TITLE 
58, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, DO NOT 
CONSTITUTE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEL-
.EGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. 
POINT V 
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REM-
EDIES IS ORDINARILY A PREREQUISITE 
TO RECOURSE TO THE COURTS. 
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T'HE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN THE PRO·F·ES-
SION OF ARCHITECTURE IS A PROPERTY 
RIGHT WHICH APPELLANT IS ENTITLED 
TO PROTECT BY RECOURSE TO THE 
COURTS. 
Respondents heartily adopt this Point I contended for 
by appellant. In fact, we would go so far as to accept this 
proposition as it is stated in People v. Brown, 407 Ill. 565, 
95 N. E. 2d 888, 893. That court had this to say: 
"A person's business, profession, trade, occu-
pation, labor, and the avails from each constitute 
'property' envisioned in constitutional provisions 
that all men have certain inherent and inalienable 
rights, such as the rights to life, liberty, and pur-
suit of happiness, and that such rights plus the right 
of 'property' shall not be taken from a person except 
by due process of law." 
See also Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 546, 133 P. 2d 
325, 330. 
POINT II 
AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY HAS NO 
POWER TO PASS ON THE CONSTITUTION-
ALITY OF A LEGISLATIVE ACT. 
This Point II, as propounded by appellant, is most 
certainly sound in law. The argument presented thereunder 
by appellant appears, at first blush, also to be sound; but, 
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closely examined, such an argument fails in merit as to the 
issues in the case at bar. 
Appellant complained in the court below of the stat-
utes of the State of Utah as such satutory enactments affect 
his right as an architect to follow this profession and can .. 
ing. Appellant did not seek, in this cause, a trial de novo 
on the issue of whether appellant failed or pa~sed the exam-
ination given by the Department of Business Regulation 
of the State of Utah. There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the said Department of Registration has, at 
any time, endeavored to rule on the constitutionality of any 
of the statutes from whence life springs for the functions 
of that department. 
POINT III 
THE DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE PRO-
CEDURE IS A CORRECT PROCEDURE FOR 
CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF THE STATUTES IN QUESTION. 
Here again appellant states what respondents think is 
a proper interpretation of the law. Declaratory and in-
junctive relief, as well as prohibitive procedures, have long, 
if in fact not at all times, been available to litigants in the 
courts of this State to test constitutional issues. We need 
cite no further authority than that of appellant for this 
proposition. 
POINT IV 
SECTIONS 7 AND 13 OF CHAPTER 1, TITLE 
58, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, DO NOT 
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CONSTITUTE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEL-
EGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. 
Respondents and appellant here and at this point, come 
to a parting of the ways. 
Whether the present licensing laws for architects in 
the State of Utah have or have not caused a great deal of 
dissatisfaction is not here an issue. Future legislators, in 
their collective wisdoms, will meet and assemble to make 
the laws that will control that situation. Appellant's argu-
ment to that proposition is both interesting and enlighten-
ing, but not pertinent here. 
The issues squarely put and for decision here are "do 
Sections 7 and 13 of Chapter 1, Title 58, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, offend against the constitutional guarantees of 
due process of law-Article I, Section 7, Constitution of 
Utah and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States of America. Respondents think not. 
Section 58-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, when ap-
pellant commenced this action, provided : 
"It shall be the duty of the several representa-
tive committees to submit to the director standards 
of qualification for their respective professions, 
trades or occupations requisite in applicants for 
license, and methods of examination of applicants. 
They shall conduct examinations at the request of 
the director to ascertain the qualifications and fit-
ness of applicants to practice the profession, trade 
or occupation for which the examination may be 
held, shall pass upon the qualifications of applicants 
for licenses, certificates or permits and shall submit 
in writing their findings and conclusions to the di-
rector.'' 
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And, Section 58-1-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads as 
follows: 
"The following functions and duties shall be 
exercised or performed by the department of regis-
tration but only upon the action and report in writ-
ing of the appropriate representative committee·: 
"(1) Defining for the respective professions, 
trades and occupations what shall constitute a school, 
college, university, department of university or 
other institution of learning as reputable and in 
good standing. 
"(2) Establishing a standard of preliminary 
education deemed requisite to admission to any 
school, college or university. 
" ( 3) Prescribing the standard of qualification 
requisite in applicants for licenses before license 
shall issue. 
" ( 4) Prescribing rules governing applications 
for licenses, certificates of registration, permits, 
student cards or apprentice cards. · 
" ( 5) Providing for a fair and wholly impartial 
method of examination of applicants to determine 
their qualifications to exercise the respective pro-
fessions, trades or occupations. 
" ( 6) Defining unprofessional conduct, except 
as herein otherwise provided." 
Both sections were amended by the 1955 Legislature and, 
as amended, enlarge upon the authority of the so-called 
"representative comn1ittees." These amendn~ents are not 
in issue in this cause. 
The constitutionality of the licensing acts of the State 
of Utah has many tin1es been adjudicated. People v. Has-
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brouck, (1895), 11 Utah 291, 39 P. 918; State v. Waldram 
(1924), 64 Utah 426, 231 P. 431; George W. Baker v. De-
partment of Registration (1931), 78 Utah 424, 3 P. 2d 
1082; Moormeister v. Golding (1933), 84 Utah 324, 27 P. 
2d 447; State ex rel. Hallen v. Utah State Board in Optom-
etry (1910), 37 Utah 339, 108 P. 347. It has been consist-
ently held that the statutes are constitutional and within 
the police power of the State. 
Now that the wheat has been separated from the chaff, 
we have remaining this question: Does the power vested 
by statutes, 58-1-7 andjor 58-1-13, U. C. A. 1953, in the 
"representative committees" violate the limitation imposed 
upon the Legislature by the Constitutions of the State and 
Nation in the delegation of administrative authority? Ap-
pellant contends that the statutes are so violative because: 
"1st. The director or regulation can only make 
provision for the qualification [examination] of 
architects if a board created from practicing archi-
tects first acts. 
"2nd. The licensing power is delegated to an 
administrative agency without any standards having 
been prescribed. 
"3rd. Neither the director nor the architects' 
representative committee are required to give each 
applicant uniform and equal protection." 
Will appellant's contentions bear close scrutiny? 
Section 58-1-1, U. C. A., 1953, provides: 
"There shall be a department of the state gov-
ernment within the department of business regula-
tion known as the 'Department of Registration,' 
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which shall be charged with administering the laws 
regulating professions, trades and occupations as in 
this title provided." 
Under this authority and in the manner prescribed by 
58-1-7 andjor 58-1-13, U. C. A., 1953, the department func-
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Lawyers have to satisfy the Bar Examiners as to their edu-
cational and moral qualifications. 
The policy of the law favors the placing of detailed 
responsibility in administrative officers. The Supreme 
Court of the United States has held that in the determina-
tion of what the Legislature may do in seeking assistance 
from. administrative officers, the extent and character of 
that assistance, must be fixed according to common sense 
and the inherent necessities of governmental co-ordination. 
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J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 72 
L. Ed. 624, 48 S. Ct. 348. What better sense could be exer-
cised than to have applicants for license in the professions 
and trades examined as to their qualifications by persons 
learned in the calling? 
It is said in 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, page 960, 
Sec. 242, that: 
"There are no constitutional objections arising 
out of the doctrine of the separation of the powers 
of government to the creation of administrative 
boards empowered within certain limits to adopt 
rules and regulations and authorized to see that the 
legislative will expressed in statutory form is carried 
out by the persons or corporations over whom such 
board may be given administrative power. Boards 
and commissions of this character do not exercise 
any of the powers delegated to the legislature. They 
do not make any laws. They merely find the exist-
ence of certain facts, and to these findings of fact 
the law enacted by the legislature is applied and 
enforced." 
And, at page 962 : 
"An administrative board is not necessarily 
using judicial powers if it exercises discretion. For 
example, the ascertainment and determination of 
qualifications to practice medicine by a board of 
medical examiners appointed for that purpose do 
not constitute the exercise of a power which exclu-
sively belongs to the judicial department of the gov-
ernment. The same principle sanctions statutes vest-
ing state administrative boards with supervisory 
powers over various professions and businesses, 
such as the power to revoke the licenses to practice 
of those engaged in such businesses or professions, 
for both general and specific reasons." 
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We now have the general rule. 
Appellant says, "Neither the director nor the architects 
Representative Committee are required to give each appli-
cant uniform and equal protection." Section 58-1-7, U. C. 
A., 1953, provides: 
"It shall be the duty of the several representa-
tive committees to submit to the director standards 
of qualification for their respective professions, 
trades or occupations requisite in applicants for 
license, and methods of examination of applicants. 
They shall conduct examinations at the request of the 
director to ascertain the qualifications and fitness 
of applicants to practice the profession, trade or 
occupation for which the examination may be held, 
shall pass upon the qualifications of applicants for 
licenses, certificates or permits and shall submit in 
writing their findings and conclusions to the di-
rector." 
The omission of the Legislature of which appellant com-
plains, is the lack of an admonishment to the "representa-
tive committee" by the Legislature "to give each applicant 
uniform and equal protection." "Vv ... e must presume, however, 
that administrative boards will act in good faith within 
the scope and power of their authority; and if they fail to 
do so, there are remedies for their control. Appellant to the 
contrary notwithstanding, the Legislature did provide for 
each applicant "uniform and equal protection." Section 
58-1-13, U. C. A., 1953, in part provides: 
" ( 5) Providing for a fa.ir and zvholly impartial 
method of examination of applicants to determine 
their qualifications to exercise the respective pro-
fessions, trades or occupations." (Emphasis added.) 
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Secondly, appellant complains of the statutes claiming 
that the licensing power is delegated to an administrative 
agency without standards having been prescribed. Appel-
lant cites 53 C. J. S. 2d, Section 15, page 508, and concludes 
with: 
"* * * Where discretion is to be exercised 
by administrative officials, proper guides for the 
use of such discretion may and, as a general rule, 
must be established by the enactment. * * *" 
(Emphasis added.) 
The same authority has this to say further and immediately 
subsequent to the quotation of appellant: 
"* * * In prescribing guides for adminis-
trative action, the enactment need not cover every 
detail, and it need not fix all the: conditions on which 
a license may be granted by an official where it 
would be impracticable to lay down a comprehensive 
rule or tvhere the enactment relates to the adminis-
tration of a police regulation and is necessary for 
the protection of the public. In some instances a 
regulatory measure vesting an absolute discretion in 
an administrative body to grant or refuse a license 
has been held valid, and it has been held to be no 
objection to a licensing ordinance, vesting the power 
in a city council to grant or refuse licenses, that it 
does not prescribe any standards to guide the coun-
cil in the exercise of this function." (53 C. J. S. 2d 
509, emphasis added.) 
In an action similar to this and where a declaratory 
judgment was also sought, the United States District_ Court 
for Idaho had, in part, this to say : 
"The general principle granting authority to 
the legislature under the police power is that trades 
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or professions can be regulated where they effect 
the health, comfort and safety of the public * * *. 
"The legislature may also authorize a board of 
examiners to prescribe and determine the qualifica-
tions required * * * unless such qualifications 
exceed constitutional limitations and are unreason-
able * * * If the Board prescribe fair and 
reasonable qualifications appropriate to the calling 
intended to be regulated and operating generally 
upon all in like situations their acts would be valid. 
The principles thus stated are in accord with the 
weight of authority." 
Montejano v. Rayner, 33 Fed. Supp. 435. 
The Supreme Court of the United States (1923) said 
this of the issue here : 
"* * * a statute providing that any person 
of good moral character, having a diploma from a 
dental college in good standing, and desiring to prac-
tice dentistry, should make application for examina-
tion with the dental board, and that all persons suc-
cessfully passing such examination should be regis-
tered as licensed dentists, was upheld against the 
objection that it failed to prescribe the scope and 
character of the exa.mination, the court saying : 'The 
general standard of fitness and the character and 
scope of the examination are clearly indicated. 
Whether the applicant possesses the qualifications 
inherent in that standard is a question of fact. * * * 
The decision of that fact involves ordinarily the de-
termination of two subsidiary questions of fact. The 
first, what the knowledge and skill are which fit 
one to practice the profession. The second, whether 
the applicant possesses that knowledge and skill. The 
latter finding is necessarily an individual one. The 
former is ordinarily one of general application. 
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Hence, it can be embodied in rules. The legislature 
itself may make this finding of the facts of general 
application, and, by embodying it in the statute, 
make it law. When it does so, the function of the 
examining board is limited to determining whether 
the applicant complies with the requirements so de-
clared. But the legislature need not make this gen-
eral finding. To determine the subjects of which 
one must have knowledge in order to be fit to prac-
tice dentistry; the extent of knowledge in each sub-
ject; the degree of skill required; and the procedure 
to be followed in conducting the examination,-these 
are matters appropriately committed to an admin-
istrative board.'" (Emphasis added.) 
Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165, 67 L. Ed. 590, 
43 S. Ct. Rep. 303 [54 A. L. R. 1104, 1114, 
Annotation] . 
Respondents think this to be the declared law in this State; 
this Court said, in Rowell v. State Board of Agriculture, 98 
Utah 353, 99 P. 2d 1, 3: 
"That the legislature may not surrender or dele-
gate its legislative power is elemental. 
"It may, however, provide for the execution 
through administrative agencies of its legislative 
policy, and may confer upon such administrative 
officers certain powers and the duty of determining 
the question of the existence of certain facts upon 
which the effect or execution of its legislative policy 
may be dependent. McGrew v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 96 Utah 203, 85 P. 2d 608; Morgan v. United 
Sta.tes, 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 L. Ed. 1129. 
Said the New York Court in Elite Dairy Products v. 
Ten Eyek, 271 N. Y. 488, 3 N. E. 2d 606, 609: 'The 
Legislature may properly authorize an administra-
tive officer to * * * determine questions of 
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fact. Any discretion there left to the administrative 
officer is confined to a designated field, and within 
that field rests, not upon unfettered choice, but 
upon the application of rules of reason to facts 
proven or found.' " 
The "representative committees," the duties of which are 
set forth in 58-1-7, U. C. A., 1953, are the "fact finders" 
and the delegation of that authority is in no wise repugnant 
to the Constitution in so-called "police power legislation." 
Finally, your appellant complains of the provision of 
the statute that "expressly provides that the director may 
fix the qualifications and do the other things enumerated 
in Section 58-1-13 only upon the action and report in writ-
ing of the appropriate representative committee. So, as 
appellant says, "If the board of architects takes no action 
at all, the director could not prescribe any qualifications." 
The complete answer to that is that the board of architects 
did and have acted; that it must be presumed that a public 
official will perform his duties; and, that where there is 
a failure of performance or even where there is an arbi-
trary exercise of discretion or judgment by an officer, a 
writ of mandamus may issue to require the performance of 
his duty. City of Wewoka v. Rose Lawn Dairy, (Okla.), 
212 P. 2d 1056, 1059. 
POINT V 
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REM-
EDIES IS ORDINARILY A PREREQUISITE 
TO RECOURSE TO THE COURTS. 
The court below found : 
"That the plaintiff has failed, neglected and re-
fused to exhaust his administrative remedies." 
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Section 58-1-16 of the act provides: 
"Whenever the director is satisfied that sub-
stantial justice has not been done in an examination, 
he may order a reexamination either before the same 
committee or another committee appointed for that 
purpose." 
Appellant made application for re-examination under this 
provision of the statute. The ruling was in appellant's favor 
and a further examination [as to those sections which ap-
pellant had failed] was ordered ; appellant declined and 
chose to seek relief through the courts. Respondents think 
that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is ordinarily 
a prerequisite to recourse to the courts. We cite the Colo-
rado case of Heron v. City of Denver (1955), 283 P. 2d 647, 
650, wherein that court said : 
"* * * Where administrative remedies are 
provided, this policy of orderly procedure should be 
followed, particularly when the matter of which 
complaint is made, or by which the party is ag-
grieved, is such as is within the province of the ad-
ministrative authority to correct. Unless the ad-
ministrative remedies are exhausted it never can be 
known but what a correction would ensue if the 
authorities were given full opportunity to pass upon 
the matter." 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant should go hence and with naught; respon-
dents should have their costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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